Incentives and Individual Audit: theory and empirical evidences of the Nota Fiscal Paulista Program
Marcelo Arbex, Fabiana Rocha, Patrícia Toporcov
this project has two goals. First, to propose a theoretical model that captures the incentive structure when it comes to the individual decision-making process of whether to ask for the eletronic invoice. In this sense, we intend to define the problem of tax evasion as well as the incentives proposed to reduce the evasion in a model of representative agent. The government would then have to choose a optimum type of audit policy, namely sending an auditor to the venues or choosing the optimum level of reimbursement to the agents that are willing to ask for the eletronic invoice. This model would serve as guidelines to the next step. Then, the project would evaluate if the eletronic invoice bonus program actually had an impact on the revenues of the states that implemmented those policies. In other words, if the program actually reached the expected goal, which is to lead to an increase in the statement of income by companies, discouraging bribes to inspecting agents and consequently an increase in tax revenues.